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The German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) states in its (already) infamous
PSPP judgment that “the specific manner in which the CJEU applies the principle
of proportionality in the case at hand renders that principle meaningless for the
purposes of distinguishing, in relation to the PSPP, between monetary policy and
economic policy” (par. 127).
In the accompanying press release, the FCC further emphasizes that ‘[the] review
undertaken by the CJEU with regard to whether the ECB’s decisions on the PSPP
satisfy the principle of proportionality is not comprehensible; to this extent, the
judgment was thus rendered ultra vires.’ 
The claim presents a formidable challenge to the CJEU and brings the constitutional
conversation between two judicial giants to a new level: What (method) does it take
to be a court?
The FCC and the CJEU have a history of constitutional conversations (succinctly
outlined here). The tone has not always been nice and friendly. In substance,
however, those conversations seemed legally sophisticated and consequential to
the process of integration: democracy, rule of law, human rights, supremacy. They
were, most of us hoped, constructive. Audaciously, many of us believed, they have
been enriching, doctrinally and theoretically, bringing conceptual sophistication, and
furthering the understanding of the nature and the functioning of the supranational
legal order (also beyond the idea of constitutional pluralism).
In practice, the engagement of highest national courts with the CJEU implied
cooperation, and the acceptance of the European constitutional arrangement.
National high courts seemed to understand and acknowledge that no court could
rule a complex legal system in isolation and with impunity. The diversity of legal
traditions, cultural perceptions and professional viewpoints was apparent, and at
times clashing. But outwardly, courts seemed to practice mutual ‘recognition’ and
respect of their ‘court-like-ness.’  
The PSPP judgment has the potential to upend this quasi symbiotic arrangement
(the naïve interpretation) or expose it as a sham (the cynical interpretation). The fact
is that the FCC overtly considered the CJEU’s assessment of proportionality, a.k.a.
its judicial method, substandard, and therefore the judgment (the outcome of the
balancing act) was ultra vires.
The Danish Judgment
To be clear, this is not the first time that someone passionately objected to the
CJEU’s method (remember Hjalte Rasmussen) and not the first time that someone
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found it unappealing, neither (Margaret Thatcher comes to mind, among many
others). It is not even the first time that a high court of a member state objected. In
recent history, the Danish Supreme Court rebelled against conform interpretation
in the Ajos case (Case15/2014 Dansk Industri, hereinafter ‘the Danish judgment’ –
do not look for it, the Danish Supreme Court took it off its website!). It saw conform
interpretation, methodologically, as an intrusive foreign element that had no place
in the Danish legal system, and something highly unbecoming to a self-restrained
court.
By refusing to twist the meaning of the Danish law to the point where its
interpretation would be contra legem (in its own opinion, and contrary to the opinion
of the Advocate General and the Danish government), the Danish Supreme Court
refused to give horizontal direct effect to the unwritten general principle of EU
law (discrimination on grounds of age). A court, committed to textualism, felt
uncomfortable and unable to break out of its interpretative way to override thirty plus
years of its case law, written national statutes, and the principle of legal certainty.
And it felt especially uneasy about disapplying the national law. This was against
its core mission: to apply the valid Danish law. The Danish Act of Accession, the
Danish Supreme Court reasoned, did not give it the mandate to rewrite that law with
unwritten European principles, which were fuzzy and questionably (methodology
wise) deduced from the spirit of the Treaties.  
The reasoning of the Danish Supreme Court oozes the apparent virtue of judicial
restraint, giving weight to legislative texts and especially to the intention of the
legislator (extensively citing the preparatory works, ministerial records, and
parliamentary debates). Similarly, the discourse of the FCC oozes judicial virtue and
craftsmanship. In contrast to the Danish judgment, it is written in the most elegant
and sophisticated legal prose. But that should not distract us from two facts:
First, the FCC is teaching the CJEU how to apply the proportionality test
when interpreting EU law (SIC!) and it feels entitled to do so because, “[t]he
methodological standards recognised by the CJEU for the judicial development of
the law are based on the (constitutional) legal traditions common to the Member
States (cf. also Art. 6(3) TEU, Art. 340(2) TFEU), which are notably reflected in the
case-law of the Member States’ constitutional and apex courts and of the European
Court of Human Rights.” In other words, these standards are German standards, too,
and they are elaborated and upheld in the German constitutional practice.
Moreover, the FCC holds that the CJEU “cannot simply disregard such practice.
The particularities of EU law give rise to considerable differences with regard to
the importance and weight accorded to the various means of interpretation. Yet
the mandate conferred in Art. 19(1) second sentence TEU is exceeded where
the traditional European methods of interpretation or, more broadly, the general
legal principles that are common to the laws of Member States are manifestly
disregarded.”
Second, the methodological critique comes across as a mask for a profound dislike
of the outcome of the balancing test, and the constitutional implications, which
it ultimately involves (and which are being widely blogged here and elsewhere).
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The FCC exposes the CJEU’s use of proportionality as a façade, a cover for its
reluctance to engage in a genuine and consequential constitutional debate worthy
of the apex court (I wonder whether an economist could tell us – with or without
reading the case law – where to draw the line between monetary and economic
policy. And, I would suggest, there is something good to be said about marginal
review when complex economic and technical assessments are at play). Simply,
the CJEU’s standard of review is just too low, too lax, too permissive. This is a quite
refreshing rationale to all of us who were schooled into looking at the methodology
of the CJEU as a façade for “unbridled policy making,” a gallop to total erosion of
national competence (Hjate Rasmusen, of course).
But the fact that judicial method is not apolitical and that legal texts don’t determine
the method of their interpretation, is yesterday’s news to anyone that has ever set
foot in a court (or read any book on legal argumentation, judicial behavior or legal
language – so, basically, any book that one can get her hands on in a law library).
Lessons on how to be a court
So, why do I think that the FCC brought the challenge to a whole new level?
Here is the crucial and most important difference between the Danish judgment and
the judgment of the FCC: The FCC is teaching the CJEU how to be a court worthy of
the title. And it is doing so for the most unsophisticated of all reasons: The FCC does
not like the outcome.
First, it is more than a faux pas in the dance of interpretation and European judicial
discourse to call a fellow court incompetent and unable to perform its core function
up to a judicial standard. It is a clash.
Second, it is because I tend to interpret the FCC’s move as a violation of the
unwritten “code of professional ethics” that binds European judges as a corps. It
is their duty and responsibility to continuously reassure the legal actors and the
general public that while we might not always agree with the outcomes that they
reach, they reach them in conformity with the rules of law and using the accepted
and acceptable judicial tools lege artis. In other word, that they know what they are
doing, and that they are doing their job up to a (professional) standard. Law (and I
include the rule of law, just to avoid any misunderstanding) thrives on misrecognition
(Bourdieu). By violating the code, the FCC might have demonstrated the mastery
of the technique (or not even, as suggested by other commentators). At the same
time, it tore down the wall of perception of neutrality and universality, the core
elements that sustain the force of law. We have nowhere to go in search of judicial
authority. Alas. But, things could have been different. When we still innocently
discussed supremacy, thanks to those constitutional conversations that I mentioned
above, Joseph Weiler suggested we thought along the lines of constitutional
tolerance. How about if we, in light of the latest development, extended this thinking
to methodological acceptance, as a potpourri of mutual recognition and constitutional
tolerance that would eliminate the foul smell of incompetence. How would it work?
When the CJEU interprets EU law and uses the methods of interpretation that it
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deems suitable for the legal text that it is interpreting, and explains its choice of
method, we will not second guess them. Even when they are impossible to apply
to the national law. Just like if the consumer can tell the difference between butter
and margarine, it does not matter whether the latter comes in a cube or any other
form (Rau, obviously). Maybe the judgment of the FCC is a desperate cry for
more methodological integrity and if it is, we should be willing to go along with the
argument.
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